For the class of vertex cover games (introduced by Deng et al., Math. Oper. Res., 24:751-766, 1999 [2]), we investigate the population monotonic allocation schemes (introduced by Sprumont, Games Econ. Behav., 2: 378-394, 1990 [9]). We present a complete characterization for the class of vertex cover games admitting a population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS for short), i.e., a vertex cover game has a PMAS if and only if the underlying graph is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free. Our characterization implies that the existence of a PMAS can be determined efficiently for vertex cover games. We also propose an alternative description for PMAS-es in vertex cover games based on the dual linear program of the vertex cover problem, which reveals the dualbased allocation scheme nature of PMAS-es. Moreover, we give a complete characterization for integral PMAS-es in vertex cover games via stable matchings and show that the celebrated Gale-Shapley algorithm (introduced by Gale and Shapley, Amer. Math. Monthly, 69:9-15, 1962 [4]) can be used to produce all integral PMAS-es in vertex cover games.
Introduction
Cooperative game theory lays out a theoretical framework for analyzing cooperation among independent participants. An essential issue in a cooperative game is to find an adequate allocation to distribute the expected cost of the coalition to individual participants. There are many criteria for evaluating how "good" an allocation is, such as fairness, stability, and so on. Emphases on different criteria lead to different solution concepts, e.g., the core, the Shapley value, the nucleolus, the bargaining set, and the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution. Among those solution concepts, the core which addresses the issue of stability is one of the most attractive solution concepts.
The core in a cooperative game is the set of allocations for the grand coalition (i.e., the coalition of all participants), under which no participant can derive a better payoff from leaving the grand coalition, either individually or as a subgroup. However, an allocation that lies in the core does not necessarily guarantee the unhindered formation of a coalition, as the cost allocated to participants in the current coalition may increase when a new participant joins in.
To study allocations in a growing population, the concept of population monotonic allocation schemes (PMAS-es for short) [9] was introduced, which requires the cost allocated to every participant of a coalition to decrease as the coalition grows. Thus a PMAS gives no incentive to any participant to block the growth of coalition. The intuition behind PMAS-es is an appealing "strength in numbers" property, i.e., no one would have an incentive to block coalition growth and hence the grand coalition is always achieved. Besides, PMAS-es shift the attention from allocations only for the grand coalition to allocation schemes, which deal with partial cooperation and provide allocations for any coalition. Hence a PMAS provides an allocation, not only for the grand coalition but also for every possible coalition, under which no participant of any coalition derives a worse payoff after a new participant joins in. Moreover, the set of allocations for the grand coalition that can be reached through a PMAS can be seen as a refinement of the core: the core provides allocations in a sense of stability, while PMAS-es provide allocations in a sense of dynamic stability.
Populations monotonic allocation schemes were first studied by Sprumont [9] , where some characterizations on PMAS-es were provided. In particular, Sprumont proved that submodularity is sufficient for existence of a PMAS. In [7] , Okamoto gave a complete characterization for the class of submodular coloring games and the class of submodular vertex cover games respectively. Based on the structural description of submodular coloring games [7] , Hamers et al. [6] managed to characterize PMAS-es in coloring games. Motivated by the work of Hamers et al. [6] , we investigate PMAS-es in vertex cover games by generalizing the characterization of submodular vertex cover games [7] . Our results are in the same spirit as the results of Hamers et al. [6] . We give a complete characterization for vertex cover games admitting a PMAS, i.e., a vertex cover game has a PMAS if and only if the underlying graph is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free. Our characterization implies that the existence of a PMAS for vertex cover games can be determined efficiently. Our proof provides a procedure that produces a PMAS for vertex cover games. We also give a complete characterization for integral PMAS-es in vertex cover games via stable matchings and show that the celebrated Gale-Shapley algorithm [4] for stable marriage problem can be used to produce all integral PMAS-es in vertex cover games. Moreover, inspired by the work of Chen et al. [1] , we propose an alternative description for PMAS-es in vertex cover games based on the dual linear program of the vertex cover problem, which reveals the dual-based allocation scheme nature of PMAS-es.
Vertex cover games studied in this paper fall into the scope of combinatorial optimization games [2, 3] , which arise from cost allocations in the vertex cover problem. Vertex cover games were first studied by Deng et al. [2] , where the algorithmic aspect of the core was investigated and a complete characterization for the balancedness of vertex cover games was presented. In a following work [3] , Deng et al. gave a nceessary and sufficient condition for the total balancedness of vertex cover games. As opposed to the model of Deng et al. [2, 3] where players are edges, Gusev [5] introduced a different class of vertex cover games where players are vertices, and investigated the application to transport networks. In this paper, we focus on the vertex cover game introduced by Deng et al. [2] and investigate PMAS-es in vertex cover games. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section introducing the relevant concepts of game theory and graph theory. In Section 3, a complete characterization for the class of vertex cover games admitting a PMAS is presented. We show that a vertex cover game admits a PMAS if and only if the underlying graph is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free. Section 4 offers a dual-based description of PMAS-es for vertex cover games. In Section 5, we characterize integral PMAS-es for vertex cover games via stable matchings and show that the Gale-Shapley algorithm can be used to produce all integral PMAS-es in vertex cover games. Section 6 concludes the results in this paper by addressing some complexity issues in computing PMAS-es for vertex cover games.
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some concepts and results from game theory and introduce some notions from graph theory.
Cooperative game theory
A cooperative cost game is a tuple Γ = (N, γ), where N is the set of players and γ : 2 N → R is the characteristic cost function with the convention γ(∅) = 0. A subset S of N is called a coalition, and N is called the grand coalition. For coalition S, γ(S) represents the total cost charged to S.
for any S, T ∈ 2 N . The subgame of Γ corresponding to coalition T , denoted by Γ T , is a game (T, γ T ) with γ T (S) = γ(S) for any S ⊆ T .
A cost allocation of Γ = (N, γ) is a vector a = (a i ) i∈N , which consists of proposed costs to be paid by players in the grand coalition. A cost allocation a is said efficient if i∈N a i = γ(N ), and said group rational if i∈S a i ≤ γ(S) for any S ⊆ N . In particular, a cost allocation a is said individual rational if a i ≤ γ({i}) for any i ∈ N . An imputation of Γ is a cost allocation that is efficient and individual rational. The core of Γ, denoted by C(Γ), is the set of all imputations that are group rational, i.e.,
A core allocation of Γ is a cost allocation in the core. Hence a core allocation is a cost allocation that satisfies all players in the grand coalition and no player has an incentive to split off from the grand coalition. A game Γ is said balanced if C(Γ) = ∅ and total balanced if C(Γ T ) = ∅ for any T ⊆ N .
A population monotonic allocation scheme (PMAS for short) of Γ = (N, γ) is a vector a = (a S,i ) S∈2 N \{∅},i∈S satisfying the following two conditions:
-efficiency: i∈S a S,i = γ(S) for any S ∈ 2 N \{∅};
-monotonicity: a S,i ≥ a T,i for any S, T ∈ 2 N \{∅} with S ⊆ T and any i ∈ S.
Denote by P(Γ) the complete set of PMAS-es in Γ, i.e., P(Γ) = a i∈S a S,i = γ(S) for any S ∈ 2 N \{∅}; a S,i ≥ a T,i for any S, T ∈ 2 N \{∅} with S ⊆ T and any i ∈ S . Let a be a PMAS of Γ = (N, γ) and S ∈ 2 N \{∅}. Denote by a S the restriction of a to S, i.e., a S = (a S,i ) i∈S . It is easy to see that a S is a core allocation of subgame Γ S , i.e., a S ∈ C(Γ S ).
However, even total balancedness is not sufficient for the existence of PMAS-es, as a PMAS provides for every coalition a core allocation in the corresponding subgame in a monotonic way. Hamers et al. [6] proved that PMAS-es of monotonic cooperative games are always nonnegative. We refer to [9] for more about PMAS-es.
Lemma 1 (Hamers et al. [6] ). Let a be a PMAS for a monotonic cooperative game Γ = (N, γ).
Then a S,i ≥ 0 for any S ∈ 2 N \{∅} and any i ∈ S.
Graph theory
Throughout, a graph is always finite, undirected and simple. A graph is said connected if there is a path between every pair of vertices. A component in a graph is a maximal connected subgraph.
A bridge in a graph is an edge whose removal increases the number of components. Let n ∈ N. We use K n to denote the complete graph with n vertices, use C n to denote the graph which is a cycle with n vertices, and use P n to denote the graph which is a path with n vertices. A cycle with even number (resp. odd number) of vertices is called an even cycle (resp. odd cycle). Let H be a graph.
We use V (H) to denote the vertex set of H and use E(H) to denote the edge set of H. A graph is called H-free if it contains no subgraph isomorphic to H. A graph is bipartite if it is odd cycle free. A graph is a forest if it is cycle free. A graph is a tree if it is a connected forest.
Let G = (V, E) be a graph. The distance of two vertices u and v in G is the minimum number of edges in a path connecting them. The diameter of G is the largest distance between any two vertices in G. For any S ⊆ E, G[S] denotes the subgraph (V, S) of G, i.e., the spanning subgraph with edge set S, and δ S (v) denotes the complete set of edges incident
The vertex cover number of G, denoted by τ (G), is the minimum size of a vertex cover in G. A matching of G is an edge set M ⊆ E without common vertices. The matching number of G, denoted by ν(G), is the maximum size of a matching in G. Clearly, ν(G) ≤ τ (G), since every vertex in a vertex cover only covers at most one edge in a matching. It is well known that equality ν(G) = τ (G) holds when G is bipartite [8] .
Vertex cover games
A vertex cover game has players on edges and the game value is defined by the vertex cover number. Lemma 5 (Okamoto [7] ). The vertex cover game Γ G on a graph G is submodular if and only if G is (K 3 , P 4 )-free.
Existence of PMAS-es for vertex cover games
In this section, we show that a graph induces a vertex cover game admitting PMAS-es if and only if the graph is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free. We decompose our proof into several lemmas.
Figure 1: Forbidden subgraphs
Proof. Let a ∈ P(Γ G ). It suffices to show that the existence of K 3 , C 4 or P 5 yields a contradiction.
By efficiency and monotonicity of a, we have
which yields a contradiction. 
which yields a contradiction.
The following lemma gives an alternative characterization for (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free graphs.
Proof. We prove the "only if" part first. Let G be a (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free graph. Notice that a (K 3 , P 5 )free graph does not contain odd cycles, since any odd cycle other than K 3 contains a P 5 , and that a (C 4 , P 5 )-free graph does not contain even cycles, since any even cycle other than C 4 contains a P 5 . It follows that every (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free graph is cycle free. Hence G is a forest, each component of which is a tree. Further notice that any tree of diameter larger than 3 contains a P 5 . Hence each component of G is a tree of diameter at most 3. Now we prove the "if" part. Let G be a graph whose components are trees of diameter at most 3. Since each component of G is a tree, G is cycle free. It follows that G is (K 3 , C 4 )-free. Further notice that any tree of diameter at most 3 is P 5 -free. Hence G is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free. Before proceeding, we introduce some notions for simplicity. A tree of diameter at most 2 is called a star, which is a complete bipartite graph with a partition comprised of precisely one vertex.
The single vertex that makes up a partition of a star is called the center of star. We remark that a K 2 is also a star and any endpoint of K 2 can be viewed as the center. A tree of diameter 3 is called a pisces, which is a bipartite graph obtained from two stars by joining their centers with an edge. The edge that connects the centers of two stars is the unique bridge in the resulting pisces.
The two endpoints of the bridge in a pisces are called the bases of pisces. Clearly, a pisces has two bases. Lemma 7 implies that each component of a (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free graph is either a star or a pisces. The following lemma states that C S is a minimum vertex cover of G[S]. Proof. By Lemma 7, each component of G is either a star or a pisces. Note that the center makes a minimum vertex cover of a star, and the two bases make a minimum vertex cover of a pisces.
Since C S is the complete set of centers of stars and bases of pisceses in G[S], C S is a minimum vertex cover of G[S].
Now we are ready to present one of our main theorems.
Proof. The "only if" part follows from Lemma 6. Now we prove the "if" part. Assume that G is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free and Γ G is the vertex cover game on G. By Lemma 7, every component of G is either a star or a pisces. For every S ∈ 2 N \{∅} and every i ∈ S, define the cost allocation scheme a = (a S,i ) S∈2 N \{∅},i∈S by
i is a bridge of G incident to other edges in S,
1
i is a bridge of G not incident to any other edge in S,
where λ S (i) is the total number of non-bridge edges (including i itself) of G contained in S and incident to the same center or basis with i in G. It remains to show that a is a PMAS of Γ G .
We first prove efficiency of a. Let S ∈ 2 N \{∅} and C S be the complete set of centers of stars and bases of pisceses in G[S]. By choosing the center of every star which is a K 2 in G[S] properly, we may further assume that C S ⊆ C N , i.e., every vertex in C S is either a center or a basis in G.
By Lemma 8, C S is a minimum vertex cover of G[S], implying that γ(S) = |C S |. Moreover, every edge in G[S] is incident to at least one vertex in C S . By definition of a S , we have
for each v ∈ C S . Further notice that bridges of G are the only possible edges incident to more than one vertex in C S . By definition of a S , we have a S,i = 0
for any bridge i of G which is incident to other edges in S. Therefore, we have
We now check monotonicity of a. Let S, T ∈ 2 N \{∅} with S ⊆ T and let i ∈ S. We distinguish two cases of i. First assume that i is a bridge of G. If i is a bridge not incident to any other edge in S, then we have
If i is a bridge incident to other edges in S, then we have
Hence when i is a bridge of G, we always have a S,i ≥ a T,i . Now assume that i is a non-bridge edge
Therefore, a S,i ≥ a T,i follows in either case.
Our proof of Theorem 1 is constructive, which produces a PMAS for every vertex cover game admitting PMAS-es and motivates our subsequent work. Moreover, Theorem 1 implies that the existence of PMAS-es in a vertex cover game can be examined by checking the structure of the underlying graph. By Lemma 7, the class of (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free graphs is equivalent to the class of forests whose component is either a star or a pisces. Notice that a star or a pisces has at most two vertices of degree larger than one. Hence (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free graphs can be recognized efficiently by checking the degree of every vertex. min v∈V
x is bipartite.
Now assume that P(Γ G ) = ∅ and let a ∈ P(Γ G ). By Theorem 1, the existence of PMAS-es in Γ G implies that G is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free, which is a special bipartite graph. Since G[S] is also (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )free, it follows that γ(S) equals the optimum of DLP (S). Recall that a PMAS provides a core allocation for every coalition. Thus a S is a core allocation for S. Notice that any feasible solution to DLP (S) can also be viewed as an allocation for S. It turns out that a S is not only feasible but also optimal to DLP (S), which enables us to characterize PMAS-es in vertex cover games via the dual linear program of the vertex cover problem.
Lemma 9. Let Γ G = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G with P(Γ G ) = ∅. If a is a PMAS of Γ G , then a S is an optimal solution to DLP (S) for any S ∈ 2 N \{∅}.
Proof. Let a ∈ P(Γ G ) and S ∈ 2 N \{∅}. We show that a S is an optimal solution to DLP (S).
We first prove that a S is feasible to DLP (S). Since vertex cover games are monotonic, nonnegativity of a S follows from Lemma 1. It remains to show that i∈δ S (v) a S,i ≤ 1 for each v ∈ V .
Let v ∈ V . Recall that δ S (v) is the complete set of edges incident to v in G[S]. Clearly, δ S (v) ⊆ S.
Hence a S is feasible to DLP (S). Now we prove that a S is optimal to DLP (S). By efficiency of a, we have i∈S a S,i = γ(S). It is easy to see that P (Γ G ) ⊆ P(Γ G ). Moreover, P(Γ G ) and P (Γ G ) coincide with each other, implying that P (Γ G ) is an alternative description of PMAS-es for Γ G .
Lemma 10. Let Γ G = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G with P(Γ G ) = ∅. Then
Proof. Let a ∈ P (Γ G ). To show that a ∈ P(Γ G ), it suffices to check efficiency of a . Let S ∈ 2 N \{∅}. By Theorem 1, P(Γ G ) = ∅ implies that G is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free and so is G[S]. By Proof. By Lemma 10, P (Γ G ) ⊆ P(Γ G ) follows. It remains to show that P(Γ G ) ⊆ P (Γ G ). Notice that every efficiency constraint in P(Γ G ) is decomposed into several new constraints in P (Γ G ), each of which only involves edges in the same component of G. Hence we may assume that G is connected. By Theorem 1, P(Γ G ) = ∅ implies that G is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free. By Lemma 7, G is either a star or a pisces. Let a ∈ P(Γ G ) and S ∈ 2 N \{∅}. To show that a ∈ P (Γ G ), it suffices to prove that a S ∈ π (S). In the following, we first show that a S ∈ π(S), then show that a S satisfies all equality constraints in π (S).
We show that a S ∈ π(S). By Lemma 2, every vertex cover game is monotonic. Then nonnegativity of a S follows from Lemma 1 directly. It remains to show that i∈δ
It follows that a S ∈ π(S).
We show that a S ∈ π (S) by proving a S satisfies all equality constraints in π (S). We proceed by distinguishing two cases of G. 
Since G has no bridge, a S ∈ π (S) follows.
Case 2. Assume that G is a pisces. Denote by i * the unique bridge in G. Let v * 1 and v * 2 be the endpoints of i * . Hence v * k is a basis of G and δ S (v * k ) ⊆ S for k = 1, 2. Further notice that
The remainder of our proof is twofold: (a) we first show that a S,i * = 0 if i * is incident to other edges in S; (b) we then show that i∈δ S (v) a S,i = 1 for any v ∈ C S .
(a) We show that a S,i * = 0 if i * is incident to other edges in S by distinguishing two cases of i * .
(a.1) Assume that both v * 1 and v * 2 are incident to edges in S\{i * }. Notice that δ S (v * 1 )∪δ S (v * 2 ) = S and δ S (v * 1 ) ∩ δ S (v * 2 ) = {i * }. By efficiency and monotonicity of a, we have
for k = 1, 2. It follows that a δ S (v * 1 ),i * = a δ S (v * 2 ),i * = 0. By monotonicity of a, we have a S,i * = 0. (a.2) Assume that only one endpoint of i * is incident to edges in S\{i * }. Without loss of generality, assume that v * 1 is incident to edges in S\{i * } but v * 2 is not. It follows that δ S (v * 1 ) = S and δ S (v * 1 ) = {i * }. Since G is a pisces, there exists T ∈ 2 N \{∅} such that S T and δ T (v * 1 ) = δ S (v * 1 ) = S. Thus both v * 1 and v * 2 are incident to edges in T \{i * }, which boils down to the situation in (a.1). It follows that a δ T (v * 1 ),i * = a δ T (v * 2 ),i * = 0. Since S = δ T (v * 1 ), we have a S,i * = a δ T (v * 1 ),i * = 0. (b) We show that i∈δ S (v) a S,i = 1 for any v ∈ C S by distinguishing two cases of C S ⊆ {v * 1 , v * 2 }. (b.1) Assume that |C S | = 1. Without loss of generality, let C S = {v * 1 }. It follows that S = δ S (v * 1 ). By efficiency of a, we have
Therefore, i∈δ S (v) a S,i = 1 for any v ∈ C S .
Moreover, both v * 1 and v * 2 are incident to edges in S\{i * }. In particular, if i * ∈ S, as we have shown in (a), a S,i * = 0. By efficiency and monotonicity of a, we have
(20)
for k = 1, 2. Therefore, i∈δ S (v) a S,i = 1 for any v ∈ C S . Theorem 3 states that every efficiency constraint in P(Γ G ) can be decomposed into several new constraints in P (Γ G ), each of which is restricted to a component of G. Hence when studying properties of PMAS-es in vertex cover games, we may always assume that the underlying graph is connected.
Integral PMAS-es for vertex cover games
In this section, we first show that every integral PMAS of a vertex cover game Γ G is an extreme point of P(Γ G ), then use stable matchings to characterize integral PMAS-es of Γ G , and finally conclude that all integral PMAS-es of Γ G can be computed by Gale-Shapley algorithm. Proof. Let a be an integral PMAS of Γ G . Suppose a = 1
Hence we have a S = 1 2 b S + 1 2 c S . By Lemma 9, a S , b S and c S are all optimal solutions to DLP (S). In particular, a S is an integral optimal solution to DLP (S). It follows that 0 ≤ b S,i ≤ 1, 0 ≤ c S,i ≤ 1 and a S,i ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ S. Hence we have a S,i = b S,i = c S,i for all i ∈ S. Therefore, a is an extreme point of P(Γ G ).
Let Γ G = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G with P(Γ G ) = ∅. Theorem 4 states that every integral PMAS of Γ G is an extreme point of P(Γ G ). Unfortunately, not all extreme points of P(Γ G ) are integral even when G is a star. Consider the vertex cover game Γ K 1,n = (N, γ) with n ≥ 4. Notice that γ(S) = 1 for any S ∈ 2 N \{∅}. Thus Γ K 1,n falls into the scope of unit games investigated by Hamers et al. [6] , where they showed that P(Γ K 1,n ) has more than (n − 2) · n! non-integral extreme points. Hence for P(Γ G ), instead of all extreme points, we opt for integral extreme points and characterize integral extreme points via stable matchings.
Before proceeding, we introduce the notion of preference systems and stable matchings. Let
We call the ordered pair (G, ≺) a preference system. In particular, we call (G, ≺) a bipartite preference system if G is bipartite. A stable matching of (G, ≺) is a matching M of G such that every edge in E\M is dominated by some edge in M . For S ⊆ E, ≺ S denotes the restriction of ≺ to S. Clearly, (G[S], ≺ S ) is also a preference system. A total stable matching of (G, ≺), denoted by M, is an ordered set (M S ) S∈2 E \{∅} , where M S is a stable matching of (G[S], ≺ S ) for S ∈ 2 E \{∅}. Notice that every subsystem of a bipartite preference system remains bipartite. Hence the results of Gale and Shapley in [4] imply that every bipartite preference system admits a total stable matching. where bridges of G have the lowest rank in any preference.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we may assume that G is connected. By Theorem 1, P(Γ G ) = ∅ implies that G is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free which is a special bipartite graph. By Lemma 7, G is either a star or a pisces.
"If" part. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system where bridges of G have the lowest rank in any preference. Since G is either a star or a pisces, (G[S], ≺ S ) has a unique stable matching for S ∈ 2 N \{∅}. Hence (G, ≺) has a unique total stable matching M. Let a be the incidence vector of M. We show that a ∈ P(Γ G ).
We check efficiency of a first. Let S ∈ 2 N \{∅}. Denote by M S the unique stable matching of (G[S], ≺ S ). Since bridges of G have the lowest rank in any preference, M S is also a maximum matching of G[S]. Then for a S , the restriction of a to S and also the incidence vector of M S , we
where equality ν(G[S]) = τ (G[S]) follows from König theorem.
We now prove monotonicity of a. Let S, T ∈ 2 N \{∅} with S ⊆ T . Denote by M S (resp. M T ) the unique stable matching of (G[S], ≺ S ) (resp. (G[T ], ≺ T )). Consider a S (resp. a T ), which is the restriction of a to S (resp. T ) and the incidence vector of M S (resp. M T ). Let i ∈ S. We distinguish two cases. If i has the highest rank in any preference of ≺ T , then i also has the highest rank in any preference of ≺ S . It follows that i ∈ M S ∩ M T , implying that 1 = a S,i = a T,i .
If i does not have the highest rank in a preference of ≺ T , then i ∈ M T follows, implying that
Hence we have a S,i ≥ a T,i in either case.
Therefore, a ∈ P(Γ G ) follows.
"Only if" part. Let a be an integral PMAS of Γ G . Since G is either a star or a pisces, only the center or the bases of G may be incident to more than one edges. To show that a is an incidence vector of a total stable matching for some preference system (G, ≺), it suffices to define proper preferences for the center or the bases of G according to a. To this end, we distinguish two cases.
First assume that G is a star. Let v * be the center of G. Clearly, δ(v * ) = E(G). In the following, we define preference ≺ v * . Start with S = δ(v * ). Let a S be the restriction of a to S and i * be the edge such that a S,i * = 1. Define partial preference of ≺ v * by i * ≺ v * j for any j ∈ S\{i * }.
Then update S with S\{i * } and repeat the process above until S = ∅. When S becomes empty,
≺ v * is a well-defined strict linear order on δ(v * ). Now assume that G is a pisces. Let e * with endpoints v * 1 and v * 2 be the unique bridge of G. Then v * 1 and v * 2 are the bases of G. Clearly,
In the following, we define preferences
. Let a S be the restriction of a to S and i * be the edge such that a S,i * = 1. Define partial preference of ≺ v * k by
Then update S with S\{i * } and repeat the process above until S = ∅. To show that when S becomes empty, ≺ v * k is a well-defined strict linear order on δ(v * k ) where e * has the lowest rank, it suffices to show that a S,e * = 1 only if S = {e * }.
(27) may assume that S = {e 1 , e * }, where e 1 is incident to v * 1 . Notice that γ(S) = 1. By efficiency and integrality of a, we have a S,e 1 = 0 and a S,e * = 1 (28) for a S . Since G is a pisces, there exists S ∈ 2 N \{∅} such that S = {e 1 , e * , e 2 }, where e 2 is incident to v * 2 . Notice that γ(S ) = 2. By efficiency of a, we have i∈S a S ,i = i∈S a S ,i + a S ,e 2 = γ(S ) = 2.
Recall that γ(S) = 1. By efficiency and monotonicity of a, we have i∈S a S ,i ≤ i∈S a S,i = γ(S) = 1.
Further by efficiency and integrality of a, we have a S ,e 1 = a S ,e 2 = 1 and a S ,e * = 0.
It follows that 1 = a S ,e 1 > a S,e 1 = 0,
which contradicts monotonicity of a. Hence both ≺ v * 1 and ≺ v * 2 are well-defined preferences where e * has the lowest rank.
Hence in either case, we may define from a a proper preference system (G, ≺). In particular, when G is a pisces, the unique bridge of G has the lowest rank in either preference it belongs to. Thus for any S ∈ 2 N \{∅}, (G[S], ≺ S ) has a unique stable matching M S and a S is precisely the incidence vector of M S . Therefore, a is the incidence vector of the total stable matching M = (M S ) S∈2 N \{∅} in (G, ≺) where bridges of G have the lowest rank in any preference.
Consider the vertex cover game Γ G = (N, γ) on a graph G with P(Γ G ) = ∅. By Theorem 1, P(Γ G ) = ∅ implies that G is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free which is a special bipartite graph. Let (G, ≺) be a preference system (G, ≺) where bridges of G have the lowest rank in any preference. For any S ∈ 2 N \{∅}, applying Gale-Shapley algorithm to (G[S], ≺ S ) produces a stable matching M S [4] .
Moreover, M S is the unique stable matching of (G[S], ≺ S ). Hence M = (M S ) S∈2 N \{∅} is the unique total stable matching of (G, ≺). By Theorem 5, the incidence vector a of M is an integral PMAS of Γ G . Moreover, every integral PMAS of Γ G is an incidence vector of a total stable matching in a preference system defined on G where bridges of G have the lowest rank in any preference.
Therefore, by traversing every preference system on G such that bridges of G have the lowest rank in any preference, Gale-Shapley algorithm returns all integral PMAS-es of Γ G . Corollary 6. Let Γ G = (N, γ) be the vertex cover game on a graph G with P(Γ G ) = ∅. Then all integral PMAS-es of Γ G can be computed by Gale-Shapely algorithm.
Concluding remarks
One main result in this paper is that the problem of deciding whether a vertex cover game has a PMAS is equivalent to the problem of deciding whether a graph is (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free. According to Lemma 7, (K 3 , C 4 , P 5 )-free graphs can be recognized by checking the degree of every vertex.
Consequently, the existence of a PMAS for vertex cover games can be determined efficiently. However, even integral PMAS-es for vertex cover games cannot be enumerated efficiently, as there is an exponential number of coalitions. Moreover, deciding whether a given vector is a PMAS is already a problem of exponential size, since a PMAS provides a core allocation for every possible coalition. Nevertheless, integral allocations for each coalition in a PMAS can be computed efficiently by Gale-Shapley algorithm in vertex cover games.
